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Alexander T. Simpson*

Interstate Commerce, Use Tax, and Aircraft in
Maryland: From W.R. Grace To Complete Auto

INTRODUCTION
This article will analyze the case W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller of the
Treasury and argue that it should not have much, if any, persuasive value in a
Commerce Clause analysis of aircraft taxation.1 Grace held that an aircraft hangared
in Maryland was immune from taxation because it remained in the stream of
interstate commerce.2 Grace has never been overruled in Maryland – and, in fact,
the Court of Special Appeals cited the case as good law in 19873 – despite Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,4 which undermines (and effectively neutralizes) the legal
premise of Grace. The article will conclude by analyzing Maryland’s regulatory
scheme, which has made it easier for aircraft owners to avoid taxation,5 despite
Complete Auto empowering the State to more aggressively tax aircraft use.6

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Commerce Clause & Sales/Use Tax
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power
to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.”7 “Though phrased as a grant of regulatory power to
Congress, the [Commerce] Clause has long been understood to have a ‘negative’
© 2016 Alexander T. Simpson
* Alexander T. Simpson Esq. is an attorney at the law firm Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger, L.L.P. Mr.
Simpson is involved in several of the firm’s practice areas, including aviation regulatory, aircraft transactions,
antitrust, and corporate matters.
1. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 255 Md. 550 (1969).
2. Id. at 559.
3. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 72 Md. App. 293, 304 (1987), aff’d sub
nom., 317 Md. 3 (1989) (holding that telephone directories are not exempt from in-transit interstate commerce
taxation or from regulatory use tax).
4. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288–89 (1977).
5. Id.
6. See generally MD. CODE, TAX–GEN. § 11-208(c)(1) (2012); MD. CODE REGS. § 03.06.01.26(A) (2014).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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aspect that denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or
burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”8 More specifically, the “negative
or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation [that]
‘imped[es] free private trade in the national marketplace[.]’”9 In other words, “[t]he
Commerce Clause balance tips against [a state] tax . . . when it unfairly burdens
commerce by exacting more than a just share from the interstate activity.”10
One “common example of an intrastate burden for which a state may impose
a . . . tax is a sales tax,”11 which is “imposed on persons who purchase goods instate.”12 Use tax, on the other hand, is “imposed on persons who purchase goods
out-of-state where those goods were not subject to a sales tax[.]”13 Thus, the taxes
are complementary: “even though [they] are differen[t] in substance, they both tax,
essentially, the use and enjoyment of personal property and operate to balance the
respective burdens on intrastate and interstate commerce[.]”14 Currently, § 11102(a) of the Maryland Code Tax-General Article provides that, unless an
exemption applies, “a tax is imposed on . . . (1) a retail sale in the State; and . . . (2)
a use, in the State, of tangible personal property or a taxable service.”15
B. The Grace Case: The Maryland Court of Appeals’ View
In W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, the Maryland Court of Appeals
examined when a tax on aircraft offends the Commerce Clause.16 Grace, a
Connecticut corporation with a division in Maryland, purchased two airplanes
which were used “regularly and exclusively for the transportation of passengers and
property, primarily executives and customers of Grace, across state lines and
national boundaries to various Grace plants throughout the North American

8. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (finding that the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine invalidated a higher surcharge on solid wastes from other states).
9. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980) (finding that local exemptions to sales and use taxes are not
unconstitutional)).
10. Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 748 (1978) (holding that
Washington’s tax on stevedoring activities does not violate the Commerce Clause, as all interstate commerce
activities were within the State).
11. Frey v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 422 Md. 111, 151 (2011) (finding that Maryland’s Special
Nonresident Tax does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine because the tax satisfies the
compensatory tax doctrine).
12. Id. at 162.
13. Id. (emphasis added). See also Foss NIRSystems, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 151 Md. App. 44,
54 (2003) (“Generally, the use tax only applies to transactions subject to the sales tax but on which no tax has
been paid.”).
14. Frey, 422 Md. at 160.
15. MD. CODE, TAX-GEN. § 11-102 (2012). The sales and use tax rate in Maryland is currently 6% of the
article’s purchase price. See MD. CODE., TAX-GEN. § 11-104 (2012).
16. 255 Md. 550, 554, 558 (1969).
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continent,” including the Maryland plant.17 Both airplanes were purchased outside
of Maryland, flown immediately post-purchase to other states, and eventually the
planes were hangared at Friendship Airport in Maryland for approximately ten days
per month between flights.18
The Maryland Comptroller assessed Grace a use tax on the airplanes for “the
privilege of using, storing, or consuming the [airplanes] within the State,”19 which
was first affirmed by the Maryland Tax Court20 and subsequently by the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City.21 On appeal to the Maryland Court of Appeals, Grace
argued, inter alia, that “the two airplanes were used exclusively as instruments of
interstate commerce and the privilege of such use is not subject to local taxation.”22
To determine whether the taxation of Grace’s airplanes ran afoul of the
Commerce Clause, the Grace Court framed the test as whether “the article to be
taxed is employed” in a “local activity” that is “separate” from its movement in
interstate commerce and sufficient to constitute a “taxable moment.”23 “This
‘taxable moment’ . . . must be a clearly distinguishable termination of the interstate
movement and a separate local activity prior to the rededication of the property to
interstate commerce.”24 This test applied the so-called “Spector rule,” named after
Spector Motor Serv. v. O’Connor.25 Spector, and other then-valid precedents,
interpreted the Commerce Clause as immunizing an article from state taxation so
long as it remained in the stream of interstate commerce.26
In Grace, the Court of Appeals held that there was no taxable moment and
reversed the tax assessment:
The Comptroller urged upon us that because the aircraft were based at
Friendship [Airport], they were ‘stored’ in Maryland and were, therefore,
subject to state taxation. In our opinion, however, the airplanes are not

17.
18.

Id. at 552.
Id. at 551–53 (stating that Grace used the aircraft for business approximately twenty days per month
and the aircraft remained in Friendship Airport when not in use).
19. Id. at 559. The tax imposed on Grace totaled $33,481.60 for the period of June 14, 1961 to March 8,
1966. Id. at 552.
20. Id. at 551.
21. Id.
22. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 255 Md. 550, 556 (1969).
23. Id. at 559.
24. Id. at 561.
25. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
26. See KSS Transp. Corp. v. Baldwin, 9 N.J. Tax 273, 282 (1987) (stating that the Spector rule “assumes
that the aircraft, while an instrumentality of interstate commerce, is not taxable unless a ‘taxable moment’ in
which the aircraft is not in interstate commerce can be identified”), aff’d sub nom., 11 N.J. Tax 89 (1989), cert
denied, 118 N.J. 184 (1989). See also R. Douglas Harmon, Note, Judicial Review Under Complete Auto Transit:
When Is a State Tax on Energy-Producing Resources “Fairly Related’?, 1982 DUKE L.J. 682, 686 n.32 (1982)
(instructing that the traditional doctrine was most clearly articulated in Spector, which “declared
unconstitutional a state tax on the ‘privilege of doing business’ within the state by a company engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce”).
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“stored” at Friendship Airport. “Storage” connotes the removal of the object
from service. The evidence in the present case indicates that the airplanes
are in constant service and are used whenever the business of Grace requires
that use. All physical equipment used in interstate commerce must, of
necessity, be temporarily out of such use from time to time, if for no other
reason than to be refueled, repaired and maintained. The aircraft of
commercial airlines are regularly placed in hangars at Friendship Airport
and, indeed, are “based” in Maryland, yet the Comptroller has conceded
that these aircraft have not been and are not subject to the Maryland use
tax. Again, tractors and trailers of interstate traders are “based” at
Maryland trucking terminals but have not been subjected to the use tax.
The lower court concluded that a “taxable moment,” or separable local
activity, existed in the present case apparently because of the testimony of
one witness that the airplanes did not fly for approximately 10 days a
month. This testimony, however, was an overall “estimate”; the logs of the
two airplanes demonstrate that the days on which no flights occurred were
rather evenly distributed throughout each month and that there was no
fixed or regularly recurring 10 day period in each month. The mere
cessation of flight and lapse of time between the flights of aircraft does not,
in itself, indicate a withdrawal of the aircraft from interstate commerce. It is
apparent that airplanes cannot be constantly in motion but must make
stopovers from time to time. In order to sustain a local use tax, the interstate
event or ‘taxable moment’ is not merely one of a series of such stopovers.
. . . . In summary, it is our opinion that the two airplanes did not engage in
any local activity which can be realistically separated from their use in
27
interstate commerce.
C. A Fall from Grace
Although one tribunal stated that Grace was “correctly decided on its facts,”28 Grace
is, undoubtedly, a problematic case. First, as a matter of common sense, it is
dubious that the airplanes’ hangarage for approximately ten days per month was
insufficient to remove the airplanes from the stream of commerce.29
Second, “it would appear that the court held that both [airplanes] became
instrumentalities of interstate commerce prior to their arrival in the taxing state”

27.
28.

W. R. Grace & Co., 255 Md. at 564–66.
In re Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., No. 78-30-6B-A, 1981 WL 88974, at *6 (Iowa Dept. Rev. Apr. 29,

1981).
29. See Inter-State Nurseries, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 164 N.W.2d 858, 866 (Iowa 1969) (stating that
when personal property is purchased out of state and delivered in-state to the owner, “movement within the
channels of interstate commerce end[s]. . . . and the product [comes] to rest in [the] state,” thus subjecting the
owner to a use tax).
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merely because “[n]either airplane was [initially] delivered in Maryland . . . .”30 The
use of this factor is problematic in a Commerce Clause analysis because it
gives the purchaser control over whether it is subject to tax liability. If the
aircraft is brought directly to its home base state, the purchaser is subject to
a use tax. If the aircraft is used to transport passengers or property in
interstate commerce in the few days preceding its passage to its home base
state, the purchaser is not subject to use tax in its home base state and may
never be subject to a sales or use tax.31
Third,
Following W.R. Grace, a number of aircraft owners [unsuccessfully] argued
that the Commerce Clause prohibited the State from imposing use tax, even
where the aircraft was based in the State (a “resident aircraft”).
However, in all of those cases, the courts either disagreed with the Maryland
Court or were able to find that a “taxable moment” had occurred which
removed the aircraft from the protection of the Commerce Clause.32
In sum, there was “a fall from Grace” among the jurisprudence.33
D. The Complete Auto Case: The Supreme Court Charts a New Course
Eight years after Grace, the Supreme Court decided Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady,34 “[t]he seminal case regarding the issue of validity of a state use tax vis-a-vis
the commerce clause . . . .”35 In Complete Auto, a Mississippi tax on the “privilege”
of doing business in the state was assessed against Complete Auto and affirmed by a
local court.36 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Complete Auto’s
30. Sundstrand Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 34 Ill. App. 3d 694, 698 (1975). See also In re Woods Corp.,
1975 OK 19, 23 (1975) (“The court apparently held the aircraft became instrumentalities of interstate
commerce prior to arrival in the taxing state.”). Although the Grace Court did not explicitly make that point,
“Grace does mention the fact that the planes had made other interstate journeys on their owner’s business
before landing for the first time at Friendship.” King v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc., 647 S.W.2d 524, 530 (Mo.
1983) (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
31. KSS Transp. Corp., 9 N.J. Tax at 282.
32. Philip E. Crowther, Taxation of Fractional Programs: “Flying over Uncharted Waters”, 67 J. AIR L. &
COM. 241, 295, 297 (2002); see First Nat’l City Bank v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 310, 319 (1983) (“[T]he
case law of various other jurisdictions, where the application of a use tax to airplanes was discussed, shows no
difficulty in finding a taxable moment between the point in time when the aircraft were delivered to the
taxpayer and that point in time when the taxpayer commenced using the airplanes in interstate commerce.”).
33. Sundstrand Corp., 34 Ill. App. 3d at 699.
34. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
35. Exxon Corp. v. Wyo. State Bd. of Equalization, 783 P.2d 685, 689 (Wyo. 1989).
36. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 274–75.
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“attack [wa]s based solely on decisions of [the Supreme] Court holding that a tax
on the ‘privilege’ of engaging in an activity in the State may not be applied to an
activity that is part of interstate commerce,” i.e., the Spector rule.37
In invalidating the Spector rule, the Court stated that the rule “has no
relationship to economic realities,”38 and observed that other Supreme Court
decisions had “rejected the proposition that interstate commerce is immune from
state taxation.”39 Rather, a tax will survive a Commerce Clause challenge “when the
tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is
fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is
fairly related to the services provided by the State.”40
The Complete Auto test represents the final stanza of the Supreme Court’s
evolution on the taxation of interstate commerce:
Originally, the commerce clause prohibited state taxation of interstate
commerce; then the clause was construed to permit some taxation, but only
if the instrumentality of interstate commerce had a “taxable moment” in
the taxing state; at present, to determine the propriety of a tax on interstate
commerce, courts apply the four-prong test enunciated in Complete
Auto[.]41
The Complete Auto test focuses on the “nexus” between the taxed entity and the
taxing state, i.e., a “‘definitive link’ . . . between the state and the person or
transaction it seeks to tax.”42 Although “[t]he meaning of the term ‘substantial
nexus’ is unclear,”43 and “[c]ourts have developed different analyses for determining
whether a taxpayer has a substantial nexus with the State to permit it to be taxed,”44
courts have nonetheless recognized that such a test is a “more expansive approach”
and provides states “with greater authority to tax transactions in interstate
commerce.”45 Simply put, the Complete Auto test “is arguably easier to meet than
the ‘taxable moment’ doctrine,”46 giving states a greater ability to assess use tax on
an aircraft that spends time within its borders.

37.
38.
39.

Id. at 278.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 288 (“It is a truism that the mere act of carrying on business in interstate commerce does not
exempt a corporation from state taxation.” (citing Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975))).
40. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
41. Square D Co. v. Johnson, 233 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1076 n.4 (1992).
42. AT&T Commc’ns of Md., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 405 Md. 83, 94 (2008).
43. Crowther, supra note 32, at 297.
44. In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 485 B.R. 510, 517 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).
45. John P. Barrie, Missouri – When Should Prospective-Only Effect be Given?, J. MULTISTATE TAX’N, Sept.–
Oct. 1991, at 188.
46. Square D Co., 233 Ill. App. 3d at 1076 n.4.
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In fact, the prevailing view is that the taxable moment test is now extinct: “In
recent Commerce Clause cases the Supreme Court has consistently applied the
Complete Auto test without considering the presence of a taxable moment in order
to determine whether a state may apply a tax on interstate commerce.”47 Thus, the
Complete Auto test “has replaced the taxable moment test for purposes of
constitutional analysis.”48

II. MARYLAND CASE LAW AFTER COMPLETE AUTO: IN NEED OF A TUNE-UP
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals has identified Complete Auto as the
proper metric in a Commerce Clause analysis,49 Grace has never been overruled in
Maryland.50 In fact, even after Complete Auto, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals cited Grace for the proposition that a “State is not empowered to tax
property ‘in transit in interstate commerce,’” and as part of a discussion endorsing
the taxable moment test.51
While Grace may technically remain good law in Maryland until the Court of
Appeals has the opportunity to revisit it, the case should no longer have much – if
any – persuasive value in a Commerce Clause analysis of aircraft taxation. As one
commentator observed, “Complete Auto Transit effectively eliminated the argument
that the Commerce Clause protects a ‘resident aircraft’ from tax[.]”52

III. MARYLAND’S REGULATORY SCHEME: THE NEW FRONTIER
To some extent, however, the spirit of Spector and Grace lives on. Today, Maryland
exempts from sales and use tax aircraft that are used “principally” in interstate
commerce.53 The regulation states:

47.
48.
49.

Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 170 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1021 (1988).
Kellogg Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 204 Mich. App. 489, 494 (1994).
See, e.g., AT&T Commc’ns of Md., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 405 Md. 83, 93–94 (2008)
(noting that “[t]he Supreme Court established a four-prong test for assessing the validity, under the Commerce
Clause, of a state tax imposed on a transaction where an out-of-state entity is one of the essential parties” in
Complete Auto).
50. See, e.g., W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 255 Md. 550, 566–68 (1969) (holding that
two airplanes owned by a Connecticut corporation, but based at a Maryland airfield, were not subject to a use
tax because they transported passengers and property across state lines and foreign commerce).
51. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 72 Md. App. 293, 304 (1987),
(identifying the Complete Auto test as the proper analytic framework, but affirming the result of the
intermediary appellate court without criticizing its use of the taxable moment test), aff’d sub nom., 317 Md. 3
(1989).
52. Crowther, supra note 32, at 297.
53. MD. CODE, TAX-GEN. § 11-208(C)(1) (2012); MD CODE REGS. § 03.06.01.26(A) (2014). See MD. CODE
TAX-GEN. § 11-214(2) (allowing a de minimus use exemption, which applies only if the aircraft is in the State
less than 30 days).
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An aircraft . . . is used principally in interstate or foreign commerce if
during the first year of its use, or if the use does not extend to 1 year, then
during the lesser period of use, any one of the following tests is met:
(1) More than 50 percent of the total mileage traveled is mileage between a
pickup or delivery point in one state and a pickup or delivery point in
another state or the District of Columbia (uninterrupted by intervening
pickups or deliveries), between a pickup or delivery point within the United
States and a pickup or delivery point outside the United States, or between
pickup and delivery points wholly outside the United States. The mileage
traveled directly between one pickup or delivery point to another pickup or
delivery point within the same state or the District of Columbia is not
qualifying mileage.
(2) More than 50 percent of all trips between a pickup or delivery point and
the next pickup or delivery point, are between a pickup or delivery point in
one state and a pickup or delivery point in another state or the District of
Columbia, between a pickup or delivery point within the United States and
a pickup or delivery point outside the United States, or between pickup and
delivery points wholly outside the United States. For the purposes of this
test, each segment of a fixed or variable route between one pickup or
delivery point and the next pickup or delivery point is a distinct trip, and
trips wholly within one state or the District of Columbia are not qualifying
trips.
(3) More than 50 percent of the total days of use are days during which
there has occurred or is occurring a trip between a pickup or delivery point
in one state and a pickup or delivery point in another state including the
District of Columbia, between a pickup or delivery point within the United
States and pickup or delivery point outside the United States, or between
pickup and delivery points wholly outside the United States. A day in which
trips are made or are being made solely between pickup and delivery points
54
within any one state or the District of Columbia is not a qualifying day.
In sum, “the exemption generally applies if, during the first year of use, more
than 50% of the aircraft’s total mileage, trips, or days of use concern travel
beginning and ending in different states, or between the U.S. and another country
or wholly outside the U.S.”55

54.
55.

MD. CODE REGS. § 03.06.01.26(B).
Raymond C. Speciale & Ronald D. Golden, Sales and Tax Planning for Aircraft and Aircraft-Related
Transactions: Checklist Discipline, J. MULTISTATE TAX’N, May 2009, at 23, 31.
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Effectively, Maryland’s regulatory scheme exempts from taxation aircraft that are
used “principally” in interstate commerce regardless of whether there is a
“substantial nexus” between the aircraft and Maryland, also known as a “taxable
moment.”56 This makes it, in application, a more lenient version of the old Spector
rule, which required aircraft to remain in interstate commerce at all times,57 and far
more forgiving than the current Complete Auto test.58 Consider, for instance, the
following hypothetical: a plane sits unused in a Maryland hangar from January 1
through December 30. On December 31, the plane flies from Maryland to New
York. Although there would clearly be both a “substantial nexus”59 and a “taxable
moment,”60 under Maryland’s regulatory scheme the aircraft would have been used
“principally” in interstate commerce for the taxable year, and thus would be
immune from use tax.61

CONCLUSION
Although some have labeled Maryland as a greedy taxer,62 Maryland’s aircraft
taxation policy is pro-business and taxpayer-friendly. The State has chosen not to
tax aircraft in certain circumstances where it is nevertheless constitutionally
empowered to do so.63 When dealing with aircraft taxation for their clients,

56.
57.
58.
59.

MD. CODE, TAX-GEN. § 11- 208(C)(1).
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951).
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
Id. Notably, under a modern Commerce Clause analysis, it is possible for a “substantial nexus” to exist
between aircraft and state even where more than 50% of an aircraft’s total mileage, trips, or days of use
concerned travel interstate travel. For example, in Dir. of Revenue v. Superior Aircraft Leasing Co., Inc., the
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of use tax on a non-resident aircraft, which was used almost
18% of the time in Missouri. 734 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Mo. 1987). The court stated:
Here, even though the plane was hangared and repairs, if needed, were made in Dayton, Ohio,
there were contacts with Missouri sufficient to create a substantial nexus. During the period
April 2, 1980, through September 1981, 17.7 percent of the total flight hours were logged on
flights to Missouri solely for Superior Aircraft’s business. All of these flights, with the exception
of one for inspecting a construction site, were recorded as being for board meetings of Superior
Aircraft. The time spent in Missouri for each of those trips ranged from several days to
approximately a week.
Id. See also Frank W. Whitcomb Constr. Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 144 Vt. 466, 467–68 (1984) (using an
aircraft 17% of the time in Vermont justified imposition of a use tax).
60. KSS Transp. Corp. v. Baldwin, 9 N.J. Tax 273, 282 (1987), aff’d sub nom., 11 N.J. Tax 89 (1989), cert
denied, 118 N.J. 184 (1989). In Severn Marine, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, the tax court held—under the
Grace standard—that even if a “vessel had not entered into the stream of interstate commerce prior to its
coming to Maryland. . . . evidence of its nine month stay in [Maryland] indicates its removal from that stream
and renders it subject to Maryland’s use tax.” No.41, 1976 WL 1440, 1440 (Md. T.C. Dec. 1, 1976).
61. MD. CODE REGS. § 03.06.01.26(A) (2014).
62. See, e.g., Sindhu Madhusudan, Maryland Among Least Tax-Friendly States for Businesses, CITYBIZLIST
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://baltimore.citybizlist.com/article/maryland-among-least-tax-friendly-states-business; Tax
Friendly States 2015, MONEY-ZINE (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.money-zine.com/financial-planning/taxshelter/tax-friendly-states.
63. See supra Parts I–III.
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attorneys and tax professionals should hew to the statutory scheme;64 not only is it
the current law, but it is also friendlier to taxpayers than Grace, which, in light of
Complete Auto, cannot be considered a reliable authority.

64.

68

See supra Part III.
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